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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of the introduction of ESMA credit rating identifiers on the 
quality of ratings. These identifiers form part of the disclosure requirements placed upon credit 
rating agencies (CRAs) since 2012 under a new EU regulatory regime and have not featured in 
any prior empirical literature. Rating informativeness is gauged from bond market data. Using 
a rich dataset of sovereign rating actions by the three major CRAs for 70 countries during the 
period 2006-2016, we find that the ESMA requirement for identifiers yields varying outcomes 
across downgrades and upgrades. The rating quality associated with downgrades by Moody’s 
improves, whereas upgrades by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch are of lower quality. These results 
are consistent with greater conservatism in rating policies after the regulatory reforms. ESMA’s 
additional focus on analyst location does not reveal any consistent difference in the quality of 
ratings. 
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1. Introduction  
      A growing body of literature investigates US regulatory reforms relating to credit rating 
agencies (CRAs) and the effects of these changes on rating quality (e.g. Behr et al., 2018). 
Rating quality is important for international financial stability, because ratings are strongly 
embedded in many banking and investment regulations and therefore affect the welfare of both 
borrowers and investors (e.g. Bae et al., 2015). We focus on a unique European regulatory 
aspect which does not arise in the US regime. In 2012, the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) introduced new regulations, stipulating that credit ratings must be 
accompanied by identifiers distinguishing between ratings issued by analysts within the EU, 
versus those issued in countries that qualify as endorsed jurisdictions. For the ratings to be 
classed as ‘endorsed’, the analyst must be located in a jurisdiction which has a comparably 
stringent regulatory regime to that of the EU (EC, 2011). Further, only ratings accompanied by 
these identifiers can be used for regulatory purposes after April 2012.1 
      ESMA (2011a) anticipates that using identifiers should assist in dissemination of 
information amongst investors and support supervisory integration of CRAs. This in turn 
should benefit the functioning of financial markets and their stability, and protect EU investors 
through equivalence in the quality of ratings across countries. A strict legal and supervisory 
framework aims “to ensure that ratings are independent, objective, and of adequate quality” in 
order to underpin the confidence of financial markets and investors (ESMA, 2017b). ESMA’s 
belief is that compliance with these rules will have improved the quality of ratings used within 
Europe. To date, there is no published evidence on this. We assess the impact of these identifier 
rules on the quality of ratings, using a dataset of sovereign ratings assigned by Moody’s, S&P 
and Fitch for 70 countries from 2006-2016.  
                                                 
1 ESMA (2017a) state that more than two thirds of the ratings used for regulatory purposes in Europe are 
‘endorsed’. 
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     It is an open question whether the introduction of rating identifiers could have any 
consistent or meaningful impact on rating quality. It is important to investigate such a 
substantial policy initiative, especially with no prior evidence being available on this question. 
We also specifically examine whether the location of rating analysts (in the EU versus outside 
the EU) has any significant impact on changes in rating quality. Investigation of the effects of 
ESMA’s endorsement rules is important because such rules could potentially signal enhanced 
credibility of CRAs’ opinions. Studying the impact of these rules informs future policies and 
regulations and identifies whether their effect is contradictory or unanticipated.  
 Furthermore, our paper utilizes sovereign ratings, offering a significant contribution to the 
literature because the quality of sovereign ratings is highly important for practitioners and 
governments alike. Sovereign ratings have greater impact and influence in comparison with the 
corporate and structured ratings investigated by some recent literature on CRA regulation (e.g. 
Bae et al., 2015; Behr et al., 2018; Bolton et al., 2012; Dimitrov et al., 2015; Flynn and Ghent, 
2018; Hill et al., 2018). Sovereign ratings reflect a country’s willingness and ability to pay its 
obligations (e.g. Baum et al., 2016; Cai et al., 2019). They directly affect a country’s cost of 
borrowing and foreign direct investment flows (e.g. Cai et al., 2019), and indirectly affect the 
cost of firms’ credit via the sovereign ceiling on bank and corporate ratings (Almeida at al., 
2017; Arezki et al., 2011; Borensztein et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2016). The recent sovereign 
debt crisis in Europe has emphasized the consequences of spillovers of sovereign rating actions 
across countries and asset classes (e.g. Baum et al., 2016; Hill et al., 2018), which further 
strengthens the importance of this study.   
       The existing empirical evidence on the effects of regulation on CRAs considers non-
sovereign ratings and takes the perspective of changing competition between CRAs (Bae et al., 
2015; Behr et al., 2018). We offer a different approach focusing on the direct effect of 
regulation on rating quality, more in line with a theoretical paper by Opp et al. (2013). Although 
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sovereign ratings represent the highest proportion of the total outstanding ratings across all 
rating segments, the competition level between CRAs for sovereign ratings is the lowest across 
these segments (ESMA, 2016).  
     Most previous studies assessing the impact of regulatory initiatives on the quality of 
ratings focus on US regulations (see Behr et al., 2018; Bongaerts et al., 2012; Dimitrov et al., 
2015; Doherty et al., 2012). In addition, most prior research addresses time periods before the 
EU regulatory regime was introduced. For instance, Behr et al. (2018) use a data sample 
between 1973 and 1982, Bongaerts et al. (2012) utilize a sample for 2002 to 2008, and Doherty 
et al.’s (2012) sample is from1989 to 2000. Becker and Milbourn (2011) apply a sample from 
1995 to 2006 whereas Kisgen and Strahan (2010) use the period between 2001 and 2005. 
Moreover, our paper examines the direct feedback of regulatory authorization on ratings quality 
in contrast with previous studies assessing the price impact of regulation (e.g. Kisgen and 
Strahan, 2010).  
     Attaining information and measuring creditworthiness is costly and time consuming for 
investors, therefore many entrust this task to the CRAs. According to Becker and Milbourn 
(2011), inter alia the quality of ratings rests on their ability to communicate information to 
market participants by maintaining a stable meaning of risk classification. Low quality ratings 
might harm the information diffusion of ratings unless all market participants are well 
informed. If investors are not able to extract reliable information from ratings, this lessens their 
value and reduces the benefits for the financial system (Bolton et al., 2012). Additionally, low 
quality ratings complicate regulations and make contracting with ratings more difficult. Finally, 
ratings quality is at the centre of the policy agenda because it is closely related to banking 
regulation (capital adequacy requirements in particular). 
    In this study, following Bae et al. (2015), Becker and Milbourn (2011), Behr et al. (2018) 
and Dimitrov et al. (2015), the quality of ratings is captured by the information content which 
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surfaces through the ability of ratings to explain bond yields. The market functions more 
effectively when ratings are more aligned with bond yields. For instance, when ratings 
accurately reflect the risk of an issuer, and therefore correlate highly with its bond yields, they 
have the power to protect investors by reducing information asymmetries (Flynn and Ghent, 
2018). Therefore, our research questions are: (i) Does the quality of ratings (captured by their 
informativeness) change after the introduction of ESMA identifiers?, and (ii)   Does the location 
of rating analysts (in the EU versus outside the EU) have an impact on any changes in the 
quality of ratings? 
    To preview the findings, ESMA’s identifier disclosure rules have not fully succeeded in 
achieving the aim of improved quality of ratings. There are differences in the quality of ratings 
in the period after the endorsement regime was introduced. We find poorer rating quality (less 
informative ratings) for positive rating actions by all CRAs after the introduction of the 
identifiers, while better quality (more informative) ratings are reported for Moody’s negative 
actions. However, there are mixed findings on the impact of the specific location of rating 
analysts on the informativeness of sovereign ratings. This outcome is not unexpected because 
ratings should only reflect factors related to the expected debt servicing by the issuer, and not 
to be strongly affected by the location of rating analysts. Specifically, there is limited evidence 
that positive events by Fitch and Moody’s are less informative when the relevant analysts are 
located outside the EU (with EE identifiers), whereas S&P positive events are of lower quality 
when their rating analysts are based in the EU. In contrast, there is some evidence of better 
quality ratings for Fitch negative events when their analysts are located outside the EU.  
 Such differences across CRAs are consistent with the unequal market impacts of rating 
signals by different CRAs reported in previous literature (Afonso et al., 2012; Arezki et al., 
2011; Baum et al., 2016; Bedendo et al., 2018; Livingston et al., 2010). Our results, to a large 
extent, support those of Behr et al. (2018) and Dimitrov et al. (2015), in terms of unintended 
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consequences of CRA regulation in the US, and are in line with the theoretical predictions of 
Opp et al. (2013). 
    Despite many studies of CRA regulations (e.g. Becker and Milbourn, 2011; Behr et al., 
2018; Bongaerts et al., 2012; Dimitrov et al., 2015), no previous study has investigated the 
impact of ESMA rating identifiers and the location of rating analysts on rating quality. This 
paper is therefore able to offer many important contributions to the literature. 
 The structure of this paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 introduce the background of the 
EU CRA regulatory regime along with a summary of the relevant academic literature. Section 
4 presents the data and descriptive statistics then Section 5 describes the methodology. Section 
6 reports empirical results and Section 7 concludes the study. 
 
 
2. Regulatory developments 
2.1. European CRA regulation 
 EU CRA regulatory initiatives aim at reducing conflicts of interest, overreliance on ratings 
and spillover effects, while increasing independence and soundness of rating processes and 
improving quality of rating methodologies and ratings (ECB, 2012). ESMA believe that 
endorsing ratings from non-EU countries enables supervisory integration of the CRAs. Greater 
co-operation between outside supervisors benefits the functioning of financial markets and 
protects investors in the EU (ESMA, 2011a). According to the EC, a CRA operating in a non-
EU country needs to conform to the EU level of supervisory expectations. The usage of rating 
identifiers differentiates between ratings assigned inside/outside the EU. The regulators try to 
ensure that, in the current framework, “users of ratings in the EU would benefit from equivalent 
protections in terms of a CRA’s integrity, transparency, good governance and reliability” 
(ESMA, 2017a). The recent financial crisis showed that there is a need for stronger and more 
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stable markets and for investor protection that is transferable across states (ESMA, 2012). 
When assessing the equivalence of non-EU countries, the rules incorporate all provisions of 
the EU CRA Regulation.2 The equivalence in quality of ratings and methodologies (supported 
by the identifiers) should help to protect financial market stability. High quality ratings lead to 
improved efficiency of capital markets and improve transparency and competition (ESMA, 
2011b).  
 In seeking to influence the quality of ratings, ESMA requires CRAs to be registered as a 
regulated CRA in the EU to be able to endorse ratings (into the EU) which are originated 
outside the EU. Initially, the equivalence regime required endorsed ratings to be assigned in a 
jurisdiction which operates a regulatory regime for CRAs which is “at least as stringent as the 
relevant EU rules” (EC, 2011). The endorsement permits CRAs which operate and are 
registered in the EU to authorize ratings of entities which are part of their own groups and 
which operate outside the EU. Both the ratings assigned in the EU as well as ratings from non-
EU countries but endorsed based on the equivalence regime can be used for regulatory purposes 
(e.g., by banks).3 
 ESMA (2017b) provides an update of the initial Guidelines on Endorsement, which are a 
reflection of issues arising with the regime. It provides an updated methodological framework 
to evaluate the non-EU countries’ legal and regulatory frameworks. The main changes relate 
to obligations of the endorsing CRA, ESMA’s supervisory powers and objective reasons for 
using endorsed ratings. From 2018, the responsibility for ensuring that a CRA’s internal 
                                                 
2 These include: (i) extent of regulatory and supervisory framework; (ii) corporate governance; (iii) conflict 
of interest; (iv) organizational constraints; (v) quality of methodologies and ratings; (vi) disclosure rules; 
(vii) supervision and enforcement rules. 
3 The equivalence tests conducted by ESMA, announced before end-April 2012, concluded that ratings 
originating from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, Mexico, Singapore and the United 
States fulfil this requirement. After that date, market participants in the EU (e.g., banks calculating capital 
adequacy positions) were forbidden from using ratings originating from unrecognized jurisdictions for 
regulatory purposes (ESMA, 2012). 
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operations in a non-EU country are as stringent as those outlined by EU requirements lies with 
the endorsing CRA. It is no longer the case that the rating issued in the country meeting 
equivalence tests (e.g., Argentina) automatically meets this criterion. In addition, “ESMA 
clarifies that it has the power to request periodical information directly from the endorsing EU 
CRA regarding endorsed credit ratings and the conduct of the third country CRA”.  
 
2.2. US versus EU regulatory reforms 
One could be concerned about a possibility that the changes in quality of ratings, attributed 
to ESMA identifiers, might be influenced by elements of the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) which 
affect CRAs in the US from July 2010. In this section, we discuss the differences between the 
US and EU regulatory regimes for CRAs, to further strengthen the motivation of this study. 
Importantly, the DFA does not make any reference to the location of analysts. The section of 
the DFA relating to CRA analysts only considers the knowledge and qualification standards 
that the analysts are required to meet, e.g. training, experience, and competence for the rating 
segment (Dodd-Frank Act 936, 2010).  
Although the rules aiming at CRAs in Europe and the US are similar, the European 
regulation is more pronounced with respect to sovereign ratings. CRAs were accused of 
worsening the European debt crisis by downgrading the ratings of Eurozone sovereigns too far 
and too fast. EU regulations aim for increased transparency and completeness of sovereign 
rating methodologies, and to address the timing of rating actions. For example, sovereign debt 
ratings are to be assessed every six months and with detailed explanations for the rationale 
behind the rating actions. The CRAs are permitted to issue unsolicited ratings for sovereigns 
up to three times per year with their timing specified in advance. Sovereign ratings are required 
to be published after the close of business (Friday) and minimum one hour before markets open 
again (Monday) (OJEU, 2013). US regulation does not require CRAs to announce when 
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releasing sovereign ratings and there is no provision requesting their solicitation status (ESMA, 
2017c). As of May 2013, CRAs in the EU are forbidden from making policy recommendations, 
prescriptions or guidelines when releasing sovereign ratings and/or outlooks (OJEU, 2013). 
Another difference between the two regimes is the effort towards tackling overreliance on 
ratings by market participants, which is attributed to strong hardwiring of CRA actions in 
investment rules and regulations (Kisgen and Strahan, 2010). US regulators took significant 
steps to decrease reference to ratings (Bedendo et al., 2018). Although the BIS (2014) proposal 
to revise the standardised approach for credit risk aimed to erase the references to external 
credit ratings, it later restored and allowed the use of external ratings in Basel III post-crisis 
regulatory reforms (BIS, 2017).  
Another area of major differences between the two regimes involves quality of 
methodologies and of credit ratings (ESMA, 2017c). For instance, the US framework does not 
require CRAs to provide the credit rating information to the rated entity prior to publication in 
order to identify possible errors, but this is a requirement in Europe. 
Additional differences can be found with respect to disclosure rules (ESMA, 2017c). US 
regulation does not require the solicitation status of the rating released to be identified, which 
is the case in European regulation. Moreover, the EU (not the US) regulation requires CRAs to 
disclose, on their websites and to the supervisor, information about all entities or debt 
instruments submitted for their initial review or preliminary rating. Furthermore, CRAs in the 
EU (not in the US) are required to provide details of rating fees.  
The above comparison of the regulatory rules provides confidence that the ESMA identifiers 
introduced in 2012 were not foreseen/captured by changes in the US regulation. 
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3. Relevant credit rating literature 
 Although credit ratings play a vital role in financial markets and the literature on credit 
ratings is voluminous, research which specifically investigates ratings quality is surprisingly 
limited. The majority of closely related prior studies concentrate on the information content of 
ratings, which is approached by considering the association between credit ratings (or their 
changes) and bond yields (or their changes). Becker and Milbourn (2011) define the quality of 
ratings as their ability to transmit reliable information to market participants and their ability 
to categorize the risk of a rated instrument. Classification is especially important for regulation 
due to its requirement for stable interpretations of ratings used in contracts and capital 
requirements. In other papers, the concept of rating accuracy is used. For example, Flynn and 
Ghent (2018) measure rating quality as the gap between the level of ratings of entrant versus 
incumbent CRAs. 
 Other studies focus on the effect of ratings on the supply of debt capital with the use of 
leverage as a dependent variable. Kisgen and Strahan (2010) investigate the regulatory 
influence of various levels of ratings, rather than the impact of having a rating, on bond yields. 
The authors establish that rating-contingent regulation influences a firm’s cost of debt capital 
(bond yields) asymmetrically. Only higher ratings from a newly certified CRA correspond to 
a decline in firms’ cost of capital. These results are corroborated by Bongaerts et al. (2012), 
who state that Fitch’s ratings are important mainly for regulatory reasons as a tie-breaker 
between differing ratings of Moody’s and S&P.  
  The impact of regulation on the rating industry is mainly examined by considering the entry 
of a regulated CRA and the corresponding effect of increased competition on the rest of the 
CRA industry. Bolton et al. (2012) and Dimitrov et al. (2015) suggest that the overall quality 
of ratings drops with increased competition. Bolton et al. (2012) conclude that increased 
competition between CRAs might lead to increased rating shopping and a consequent reduced 
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wealth effect. Studying the entry of new CRAs into structured ratings, Flynn and Ghent (2018) 
find that entrant CRAs issue higher ratings than the incumbent firms, a strategy used to win 
business. This results in rating shopping on the part of issuers.  
 Behr et al. (2018) suggest that the restricted competition and increased importance of ratings 
due to their hardwiring in banking and investment regulations can have a detrimental effect on 
rating quality. The authors find that SEC regulation from 1975 increased the barriers to entry 
and captured a customer base for certified CRAs, which changed their incentives and created 
a tendency towards inflated bond ratings. In contrast, Doherty et al. (2012) study insurance 
ratings and find that the new entrant CRA chooses higher standards than the incumbent 
companies. They conclude that increased competition results in improved precision of default 
rate estimates. Similarly, Bae et al. (2015) cast doubt on the view that competition leads to 
inflated ratings in the corporate bond market. By revisiting the study of Becker and Milbourn 
(2011), these authors find that their results of rating inflation suffer from endogeneity caused 
by unobservable industry effects.  
 There is only very scarce literature on the effect of CRA regulation, which does not 
primarily emphasise a competition perspective. A theoretical paper by Opp et al. (2013) 
suggests that ratings-contingent regulation diminishes the incentives of CRAs in information 
provision. Opp et al. (2013) argue that there is known to exist a threshold level of regulatory 
gain, beyond which the regulatory arbitrage brings in the same advantage as delegated 
information attainment by the CRA. When issuers receive favourable rating treatment and its 
economic advantage is higher than that of obtaining information, regulation causes the collapse 
of the information provision process and leads to ratings inflation. They suggest that it might 
be cost-effective for CRAs to release lower-quality ratings instead of dealing with complicated 
asset structures (e.g. for banks).  
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4. Data4 
4.1. Data sources 
 The bond characteristics and pricing data are collected from Bloomberg L.P. The selection 
criteria include publicly placed, unsecured, straight sovereign bonds with fixed coupon, 
remaining maturity between 1 to 30 years and issued in US dollars. We exclude structured 
notes, inflation-linked notes, hybrid or dual-currency bonds and restructured debt. Only bonds 
with the pricing information available (historical data such as YTM) are retained. We match 
rating events with the adequate bond spread information and investigate any outliers.5 The 
dataset comprises 823 rating events6 assigned by three CRAs for 70 sovereigns.7 
     Bond spreads, in basis points, are calculated by taking the difference between the yield to 
maturity of the sovereign bond subject to the rating action and the yield to maturity of the 
comparable US benchmark bond.  We match each sovereign bond with the benchmark bond 
based on the closest remaining maturity and coupon amount. The 70 sovereigns are represented 
by 159 individual sovereign bonds. We use 76 US bonds as benchmarks for spread calculations. 
The long-term foreign-currency ratings are gathered from the three CRAs’ publications. The 
rating actions are matched with the bond data. Data for multiple bonds is normally observable 
on the day of the rating action. We select the bond with the highest issue amount per sovereign 
on the particular rating event date. For any given rating event, only one bond is considered.  
                                                 
4 We discuss Data prior to Methodology in order to explain and define variables and data issues that will be 
required in the methodology.    
5 Outliers in sub-samples are identified using the MM-robust regression method and are excluded before 
estimation. The rule applied here is that robust standardized residuals (vertical dimension outlier) which lie 
outside the range [-20, +20] and [0, 20] of the robust distance of the distribution (horizontal dimension 
outlier) are excluded from the analysis. As a result, 5% of the data sample was discarded.  
6 Because we use US Treasury bonds as a benchmark for the sovereign credit spread, we exclude the few 
rating events for the US within the sample period. 
7  The starting sample includes sovereign ratings for 91 countries, and then is reduced to 70 countries on the 
basis of bond data availability. These 70 countries reflect large developed and emerging countries.  
12 
4.1.1. Descriptive statistics 
   We identify rating events using a comprehensive credit rating scale (58-CCR point) which 
includes ratings, watch and outlook status, as follows: AAA = 58, AA+ = 55 … CCC- = 4, 
C/SD/CC/D = 1. Then, for positive watch (outlook) we add +2 (+1) whereas for negative watch 
(outlook) we subtract 2 (1), respectively (see Appendix A). Table 1 presents statistics on the 
credit events in our sample. Overall, actions of one CCR point constitute the largest share 
among all CRAs (exceeding 22% and 19% for positive and negative events respectively). There 
are 152 (194), 141 (104) and 116 (116) upgrades (downgrades) by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch 
respectively. The highest average numerical rating, based on the 58-CCR numerical rating 
scale, is by Fitch (29, equivalent to BB+/BBB-), followed by Moody’s (28, BB+) and S&P (27, 
BB/BB+). S&P releases the highest proportion of downgrades against upgrades in all time 
periods.8 The implication that S&P is the more conservative CRA corresponds with prior 
literature (e.g., Flynn and Ghent, 2018). S&P assigned the highest proportion of 2 and above 
CCR-point downgrades (16%). Fitch has the highest proportion (12%) of positive actions by 
more than 2 CCR points.  
   We also split the sample into the pre-identifier (Jan 2006-April 2012) and post-identifier 
(May 2012-June 2016) periods. From the total of 823 events, 426 (397) actions occur in the 
pre-identifier (post-identifier) period. Positive (negative) actions in the pre-identifier period 
constitute 54% (46%) of events, and they amount to 46% (54%) in the post-identifier period. 
The average rating is higher in the pre-identifier period, although the sample size for both 
periods is quite balanced, indicating that ratings are less inflated after the regulation. Given that 
the pre-identifier period includes the outbreak of the global financial crisis and the European 
sovereign debt crisis, one could anticipate the reverse i.e., ratings to be higher after May 2012.9 
                                                 
8 However, in the post-identifier period, Moody’s and Fitch issue 52% downgrades against 48% upgrades. 
9 Despite its role in the European debt crisis, Greece does not feature in our sample because it did not issue 
any bonds denominated in US dollars which met our selection criteria. 
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     Table 2 illustrates statistical properties of three event samples. The variables in the three 
CRAs’ sub-samples have similar distributions (e.g., term to maturity, coupon rate, and issuance 
amount). These commonalities allow easier comparisons of the results in the multivariate 
analysis and support their reliability. The only exception is the number of sovereign bonds used 
for representing a country. S&P has the highest number of 130 bonds whereas Moody’s and 
Fitch are represented by 96 and 92 sovereign bonds respectively. This can be justified by the 
highest number of events being for S&P. With cumulative two-day [0, +1] mean yield spread 
of 0.47, S&P has the lowest value for this variable. S&P’s conservatism could explain this 
phenomenon. According to Flynn and Ghent (2018), S&P received the greatest regulatory 
pressure in the recent years. Descriptive statistics representing the variables used in the 
multivariate analysis are also reported in Table 2. 
     Furthermore, we construct a sample of non-events where each bond on the rating event date 
is matched with a randomly selected non-event date.10 The non-event sample comprises the 
same time period but includes only clean observations. These are defined as observations where 
no credit event for that sovereign, by any of the three CRAs, occurred in a window of 30 days 
before/after the non-event date. Additionally, there must be no rating change for the US by any 
of the three CRAs within 30 days before/after the non-event date. Finally, the non-event date 
must not fall within the window of 30 days before/after the date of the introduction of identifier 
rules (30 April 2012). Additionally, when non-event and event observations are being matched 
in the pre- and post-identifier periods only, the clean observations from the relevant period are 
available for random selection. The total sample comprises 1646 observations with 692 for 
S&P, 490 for Moody’s and 464 for Fitch sub-samples respectively.11 
 
                                                 
10 If the model was estimated using only event dates, relevant coefficients would be measuring the 
incremental change of rating action exceeding one CCR point in the yield spreads. 
11 The non-event sample for each CRA contains the same number of observations as the event sample.  
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5. Multivariate analysis 
5.1. Main methods  
 In the empirical investigation, we focus solely on the impact of the introduction of regulation 
on the quality of sovereign ratings, not the interaction between changes in regulation and 
competition. Opp et al. (2013) argue that isolating the effect of changes in regulation is 
important. CRA competition plays a central role in rating quality of highly competitive non-
sovereign rating markets.12 However, the role of competition is less intensive in our setting, 
given that the big three CRAs assign the vast majority of sovereign ratings.  
 Following the empirical literature (see Section 3), the quality of ratings is captured by the 
information content of ratings (Bae et al., 2015; Becker and Milbourn, 2011; Behr et al., 2018; 
Dimitrov et al., 2015). The quality is examined by testing whether the market is more aligned 
with ratings through bond yields before or after the cut-off date. When ratings accurately reflect 
issuers’ creditworthiness and correlate strongly with bond yields, they reduce the information 
asymmetries between investors (and diminish risks for less-informed investors), which is 
indicative of high quality (Abad et al., 2019; Flynn and Ghent, 2018). On the other hand, any 
evidence of a weak correlation between bond yields and ratings suggests that ratings perform 
poorly in terms of information transmission (Becker and Milbourn, 2011). As suggested by 
Abad et al. (2019), low quality ratings harm the function of CRAs as information gatekeepers 
and make contracting with ratings more difficult.  
 If ESMA’s aims are to be achieved, we hypothesize that the link between rating changes 
and bond yields should strengthen after the introduction of the identifier rules in April 2012. 
According to ESMA (2017b), ratings issued and endorsed in Europe fulfil the equivalence in 
methodology and transparency standards representing their high quality. Therefore, ratings 
                                                 
12 For example, increased competition coincides with lower quality (inflated) ratings from incumbents in the 
corporate rating market (Dimitrov et al., 2015) and the structured finance rating market (Flynn and Ghent, 
2018). 
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should solely reflect factors related to the expected debt servicing by the issuer and correlate 
closely with the bond yields. In addition, this motivates an expectation that the location of 
rating analysts (in the EU or outside the EU) should not have a significant impact on the 
informativeness of sovereign ratings. 
 Because bond prices change far more frequently than ratings, we look at the change in 
informativeness (accuracy) levels rather than absolute match to market measures. Specifically, 
we test whether rating changes are able to explain bond yield changes (decreases or increases 
in bond spreads). This capability differentiates ratings into less or more informative. Separate 
sets of regressions for rating upgrades and downgrades are used due to their expected different 
outcomes, and for each of the three CRAs. We expect unequal effects across CRAs to be driven 
by differences in their methodologies, assumptions and performance (Bongaerts et al., 2012; 
Livingston et al., 2010). The baseline model examines our first research question regarding the 
impact of the identifiers disclosure rule on rating quality, as follows: 
𝛥𝛥Yield𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1𝛥𝛥Rating𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2Identifier𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3(𝛥𝛥Rating*Identifier)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4Rating58𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
                                            +𝛽𝛽5Maturity𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆1CF + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                 (1a)
                                                                                                                        
∆Yieldi,t is the change in yield spread to the closest maturity US Treasury Bond for country i 
on day t in the time window [0, +1], expressed in basis points.  
∆Rating is the change in sovereign issuer CCR by one of the three CRAs coded as absolute 
ordinal values 1 (1-CCR), 2 (2-CCR) and 3 (>2-CCR) for ease of interpretation, and 0 (no 
change).13 The coefficient β1 resembles the marginal effect on yield spreads as a result of a unit 
change based on the CCR scale (on an event date and zero on a non-event date). Following Bae 
et al. (2015), Becker and Milbourn (2011) and Behr et al. (2018), we use the information 
content of ratings represented by linkages between rating actions and bond yields as a measure 
                                                 
13 We also estimate Eqs. (1), (2) and (3) using a binary variable that equals 1 on the day of a rating event and 
0 otherwise. The results (available on request) are consistent.  
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of rating quality. Positive rating actions should imply decreased risk for investors (i.e. narrower 
spreads), hence we expect a negative sign for the coefficient of ΔRating. On the other hand, for 
the negative events, we expect a positive sign for the coefficient of ΔRating, as the yield spreads 
should increase to reflect the underlying risk on the bonds. 
The Identifier indicator variable equals 1 after the ESMA endorsement rules took effect on 30 
April 2012, and 0 otherwise.  
ΔRating* Identifier, the key variable in this model, measures the linkage between quality of 
ratings and ESMA’s requirement for identifiers by observing the impact of rating actions upon 
yields in the post-intervention period. The magnitude of rating events’ impact on the bond 
spread in the post-identifier period is calculated by summation of the coefficient values of 
ΔRating*Identifier and ΔRating. In the case of positive rating changes, if the sign is negative 
(corresponding to the expected sign on the ΔRating variable) and significant, positive rating 
events are informative as they are associated with narrowing bond yields in the post-identifier 
period. This corresponds to a high quality of ratings. On the other hand, if the interaction 
produces a positive significant coefficient, positive rating events widen (rather than narrow) 
bond yields in the post-identifier period, implying that ratings are of lower quality. Similarly, 
in the case of negative events, if the interaction has a positive significant coefficient, we detect 
stronger links between rating changes and spreads after the regulation was enacted, indicating 
a higher quality of ratings. Conversely, if the sign is negative, the negative events are not 
informative as they narrow (rather than widen) spreads, suggesting lower quality of ratings.  
Rating58 represents the sovereign’s CCR taking values 1-58 and represents a proxy for the 
macroeconomic conditions of the sovereigns. 
Maturityit is the natural logarithm of the remaining years to maturity of the bond i on the event 
date t. It controls for possible heterogeneity among spread changes which arise due to 
differences in the remaining years to maturity of bonds.    
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CF is country fixed effects.14  
     To examine our second research question, on the impact of rating analysts’ location on 
rating quality, Eq. (1b) is estimated to differentiate between the impact of rating events for 
issuers with EU versus EE identifiers in the post-identifier period in comparison with the 
impact of events in the pre-identifier period. Here, the null hypothesis suggests that ratings are 
of equivalent quality regardless of whether they are issued in the EU or elsewhere. Ratings 
should only reflect factors related to the expected debt servicing by the issuer, therefore we 
expect that the location of rating analysts (in the EU or outside the EU) has an insignificant 
impact on the informativeness of sovereign ratings. Superior quality of ratings issued by 
analysts located in the EU could be explained by the fact that the CRAs in the EU are under 
closer scrutiny in the post-identifier period. On the other hand, superior quality of endorsed 
ratings could stem from the fact that CRA offices in a non-EU country aim to establish a strong 
reputation for rating reliability. We test this using the following specification:  
 
Yield𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1𝛥𝛥Rating𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2EE𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3EU𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4(𝛥𝛥Rating*EE)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5(𝛥𝛥Rating*EU)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
                                   +𝛽𝛽6Rating58𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7Maturity𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆1CF + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                     (1b)                            
                         
EE (EU) takes the value of 1 if the rating of sovereign i is EU endorsed (EU originated) in the 
post-identifier period (after 30 April 2012), 0 otherwise. 
ΔRating*EE/EU tests whether any change in rating quality depends on the location of the 
analyst. Here we are testing whether ratings originated outside the EU induce more (less) 
reaction in yield spreads than the ratings issued in the EU. For instance, if the interaction 
ΔRating*EE, tested on the positive events sample, produces a negative significant coefficient, 
                                                 
14 We also estimate Eqs. (1), (2) and (3) including global time-varying risk factors (e.g. Acharya et al., 2013; 
Bedendo et al., 2018; Kahl et al., 2013). In separate estimations, we include one of three risk factors to 
explain the yield spreads: CBOE VIX volatility index, Treasury rate (5 years maturity), and interest rate 
swap spreads (5 years maturity). These results confirm the main findings.  
18 
this implies a stronger link between bond yields and ratings in the post-identifier period when 
the rating is endorsed (rather than originated in the EU). If the sign is positive and significant, 
the effect between yields and ratings decreased, implying a lower quality of ratings in the post-
identifier period when the ratings are assigned the EE identifier. The same logic applies to 
negative events, i.e. a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term implies that 
sovereign rating actions assigned by analysts located outside the EU in the post-identifier 
period are of better quality. A negative sign would indicate a weaker link between the spreads 
and ratings in the post-identifier period for ratings issued in a jurisdiction outside the EU.  
 
5.2. Time versus cross-sectional variations 
 In addressing our first research question regarding the impact of the identifiers disclosure 
rule, we conduct further investigations to ensure that some unobserved effects, which could be 
captured by the dummy variable Identifier, do not drive the results. We use two sub-samples 
(i) pre-identifier period and (ii) post-identifier period, and compare the statistical significance 
of the variable ΔRating in both periods. The following model is estimated:  
             𝛥𝛥Yield𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1𝛥𝛥Rating𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2Rating58𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3Maturity𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆1CF + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡        (2)                                                  
 In Eq. (2), following Dimitrov et al. (2015), we examine the informativeness of rating news 
in two periods, before and after the identifiers disclosure rule. When interpreting the rating 
quality, we focus on both the size and significance of the coefficients. If the ΔRating coefficient 
in the post-identifier period is statistically significant and with the expected sign (negative for 
positive events and positive for negative events) and larger in magnitude than the ΔRating 
coefficient in the pre-identifier period, we conclude that the rating news is of better quality (i.e. 
more informative) in the post-identifier period. On the other hand, if the ΔRating coefficient in 
the post-identifier is insignificant or significant with either the opposite sign or with the 
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expected sign but with smaller magnitude, then we conclude that ratings news in the post-
identifier period is of lower quality (i.e. less informative).  
 We further conduct an F-test to compare the coefficients on the ΔRating variable in the pre- 
and post-identifier periods.15 This tests the hypothesis that the beta coefficient of ΔRating in 
the pre-identifier sample (β1 (i)) is equal to the beta coefficient of ΔRating in the post-identifier 
period (β1 (ii)). Positive and negative events are tested separately for each of the three CRAs. 
If the new identifiers deliver better rating quality, then absolute values of β1(in sample (i) will 
be smaller than β1 in sample (ii), because rating changes better explain the bond yields after the 
rule was introduced. On the other hand, if the regulation has a weak effect (poorer rating 
quality), then absolute values of β1 in sample (i) will be greater than β1 in sample (ii).  
 To further investigate our second research question, ruling out any other events coinciding 
with the adoption of the endorsement rules, we disentangle the possible effect that an analyst’s 
location might have on the quality of ratings (via the use of identifiers). We estimate Eq. (2) 
using only the post-identifier period (May 2012-June 2016) with the distinction between ratings 
issued in the EU versus ratings issued in EU-endorsed countries (EE identifier). Then, we 
compare the magnitude of the coefficient of ΔRating in the two sub-samples (EE versus EU 
sub-samples) and test the statistical difference between them. The EU (EE) sub-sample consists 
of sovereign rating events for issuers with EU (EE) identifiers. The null hypothesis states that 
ratings issued by analysts in the EU and in the EU-endorsed countries in the post-identifier 
period are of equal quality. If the EU issued ratings are of higher quality, we expect the absolute 
values of β1 (ii) for the EU sub-sample to be greater than β1 (ii) in the EE sub-sample, because 
rating changes are better at explaining bond yields when analysts are based in Europe. Superior 
quality of ratings from analysts within the EU could be explained by the fact that the EU has 
                                                 
15 The test is performed using seemingly unrelated regression, which estimates the simultaneous (co)variance 
of the coefficients of the two equations being compared. 
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high levels of stringency in regulations and the actions of CRAs are directly supervised and 
overseen by ESMA. Conversely, if EU endorsed ratings are of better quality, we would expect 
the absolute values of β1 (ii) for the EE sub-sample to be greater than β1 (ii) in the EU sub-
sample because there is greater effect of the rating news on the spread in the endorsed countries. 
Superiority of ratings assigned outside the EU could stem from the fact that for these ratings to 
be endorsed, the actions of the third country CRAs issuing them need to be overseen by the 
endorsing CRA rather than ESMA. The third country’s CRAs have strong incentives to signal 
quality and reliability of their ratings to maintain their reputation in the EU system and with 
ESMA.  
 In addition, we further investigate our second research question regarding the impact of the 
rating analysts’ location, ensuring that no other events (time nor cross-section related) 
coincided with the adoption of the disclosure rules. We apply the quasi-experimental design of 
difference-in-differences estimation, where we focus on the differences arising between the 
treatment and control groups, as follows: 
𝛥𝛥Yield𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1(𝛥𝛥Rating*EEB)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2(𝛥𝛥Rating*EUB)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3(𝛥𝛥Rating*EE)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 
                                  𝛽𝛽4(𝛥𝛥Rating*EU)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5Rating58𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6Maturity𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆1CF + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡        (3)                                                       
 EEB (‘EE’ Before) is equal to 1 during the pre-disclosure period for ratings which have the 
‘EE’ identifier in the post-disclosure period, and 0 otherwise. EUB (‘EU’ Before) is equal to 1 
during the pre-disclosure period for ratings which have the ‘EU’ identifier in the post-
disclosure period, and 0 otherwise. ‘EE’ and ‘EU’ are defined as in Eq. (1b). We assume that 
the EU jurisdiction is constant (control group), while the treatment group is the endorsed group 
of ratings following from the regulatory action (EE identifiers). We assume that ratings which 
have ‘EU’ identifiers in the post-disclosure period already had ratings issued within the EU in 
the pre-disclosure period. In the difference-in-differences terminology, these ratings are not 
‘treated’ upon implementation of the identifiers regulation, hence they act as a control group. 
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It is then assumed that ratings which have ‘EE’ identifiers in the post-disclosure period were 
issued outside the EU in the pre-disclosure period. Upon implementation of the identifiers 
regulation, these ratings are ‘treated’ i.e. become subject to endorsement by the EU. In this test, 
we investigate whether the location of rating analyst affected sovereigns (EU originated vs EU 
endorsed) from both groups to a different extent. Specifically, we examine whether EU 
originated ratings captured via ∆Rating*EU are of higher or lower quality than the EU endorsed 
ratings captured by ∆Rating*EE. We consider rating events of higher quality if the interaction 
is negative (positive) and significant for positive (negative) events, and vice versa. 
 
6. Empirical results 
6.1. Main estimation results 
 Table 3 presents the results of Eq. (1a), which examines the first research question, and Eq. 
(1b), which examines the second research question, by each CRA for positive events in Panel 
I and negative events in Panel II. The coefficient on ∆Rating is significant with the expected 
sign for S&P and Moody’s positive events and for S&P and Fitch negative events. This 
indicates a strong overall link between ratings and bond spreads during the pre-identifier 
period. As expected, the effect of the identifier on the quality of ratings reveals varying results 
across CRAs. Differing market impact by ratings from different CRAs has been found in prior 
literature (e.g. Arezki et al., 2011; Bongaerts et al., 2012: Livingston et al., 2010) and relates 
to the fact that CRAs use different methodologies and assumptions (e.g. Afonso et al., 2012; 
Flynn and Ghent, 2018). Additionally, CRAs apply different weights on different factors in 
their rating processes. These differences often lead to differences (in sovereign ratings) across 
CRAs.16 The frequency of differences in CRA opinion (split ratings) for sovereign debt has 
                                                 
16 Previous literature has found that S&P tends to be the most conservative amongst CRAs and its 
downgrades have stronger effects than those of other CRAs (e.g Flynn and Ghent, 2018). Earlier research 
22 
increased significantly during and after the global financial crisis. Split sovereign ratings for 
advanced economies are now as common as they once were for emerging economies (Amstad 
and Packer, 2015).  
 Several papers report asymmetric reactions of bond yields and stock market returns to 
negative versus positive rating actions (e.g. Abad et al., 2019; Baum et al., 2016; Kisgen and 
Strahan, 2010). It is argued that rating downgrades provide a greater surprise element in 
comparison to rating upgrades (e.g. Gande and Parsley, 2005; Hill et al., 2018). CRAs might 
be less inclined to issue downgrades to sovereigns in fear of losing business within other assets 
classes in that country (Gande and Parsley, 2005). In addition, CRAs may face higher penalties 
for overstating rather understating the creditworthiness of issuers (Goel and Thakor, 2011), and 
therefore have stronger incentives to issue more conservative rather than more generous ratings 
in order to protect their reputation (Baghai et al., 2014; Bannier et al., 2010). 
 Regarding our first research question (using Eq. (1a)), Panel I of Table 3 shows poorer rating 
quality (less informative ratings) for positive events by all CRAs in the post-identifier period 
(refer to the interaction term). Conversely, better quality ratings (more informative ratings) are 
reported in Panel II for Moody’s negative events. Regarding our second research question (Eq. 
(1b)), we observe less informative positive events when S&P’s rating analysts are located in 
the EU, and when rating analysts of Moody’s and Fitch are based outside the EU. In addition, 
Fitch negative events are more informative when their rating analysts are based outside the EU 
(i.e. ratings with EE identifiers). 
        The coefficient on ΔRating (Eq. (1a) in Panel I suggests that bond spreads narrow by 
10.26 (3.420*3) basis points on average after S&P issues an upgrade by one notch (3-CCR 
points), implying a strong link between ratings and bond spreads in the pre-identifier period. 
                                                 
has also shown that S&P places more weight on rating accuracy whereas Moody’s has a greater emphasis 
on rating stability (e.g. Cheng and Neamtiu, 2009; Kiff et al., 2012).  
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The coefficient on ΔRating*Identifier is positive and significant in the results of Eq. (1a), 
implying a poorer rating quality of S&P upgrades in the post-identifier period. The magnitude 
of rating events’ impact on the bond spread in the post-identifier period is calculated as the sum 
of the coefficient on ΔRating*Identifier and the coefficient on ΔRating. On average, bond 
spreads widen (rather than narrow) by 0.672 basis points [(-3.420 + 3.644) *3] after S&P issues 
an upgrade by one-notch (3-CCR points) after the disclosure rule. In addition, the coefficient 
on ΔRating*EU (in Eq. (1b) in Panel I) is positive and significant, implying that S&P’s positive 
events are less informative when their analysts are located in EU countries. The results in Panel 
II, Eq. (1a), suggest that a one notch downgrade by S&P leads to an increase in bond yield 
spreads by 11.78 (3.926*3) basis points on average. 
     For Moody’s positive rating events (see Panel I of Table 3), the results reveal a strong 
link between ratings and the bond spreads. For instance, in Eq. (1a), an upgrade of one notch 
by Moody’s leads to a narrowing bond spread by 9.678 (3.226*3) basis points. The results also 
indicate poorer quality of positive events by Moody’s (similar to S&P positive events) after the 
introduction of the disclosure rule. This is evident from the positive and significant coefficient 
on the interaction term (ΔRating*Identifier) in Eq. (1a), suggesting that, on average, bond 
spreads widen by 0.507 [(-3.226+3.395) *3] basis points after Moody’s issues an upgrade by 
one-notch (3-CCR points) after the disclosure rule. Additionally, the results of Eq. (1b) suggest 
that Moody’s positive events are less informative when their rating analysts are located outside 
the EU (i.e. ratings with EE identifiers). Although the market reaction to Moody’s negative 
events is insignificant in the pre-identifier period (insignificant coefficient on ΔRating), their 
information content increases in the post-identifier period because the coefficient on 
ΔRating*Identifier in Eq. (1a) is positive and significant (Panel II). The coefficient signifies 
that bond spreads widen by 14.775 [(-2.039 + 6.964) *3] basis points on average as a result of 
a rating downgrade by one notch by Moody’s.  
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    The market reactions to Fitch’s positive events are insignificant in the pre-identifier period 
(insignificant coefficient on ΔRating), and their information content deteriorates in the post-
identifier period because the coefficient on ΔRating*Identifier is positive and significant (in 
Eq (1a), Panel I). The coefficient signifies that the bond spreads widen (rather than narrow) by 
2.445 [(-1.399 + 2.214) *3] basis points on average as a result of a one-notch rating upgrade 
by Fitch. The results of Eq. (1b) in Panel I reveal that Fitch positive events are less informative 
when their analysts are located outside the EU (ratings with EE identifiers) in the post-identifier 
period. Panel II of Table 3 shows that the average bond spread increases by 8.31 (2.770*3) 
basis points following a one-notch downgrade by Fitch (Eq. (1a)) in the pre-identifier period. 
The positive and significant coefficient on ΔRating*EE (Eq. (1b), Panel II) suggests that the 
effect of Fitch negative events on yields in the post-identifier period is stronger, thus indicating 
higher quality, when their rating analysts are located outside the EU (i.e. ratings with EE 
identifiers).  
 
6.2. Time versus cross-sectional variations 
    Tables 4-6 present the results of Eq. (2), which examines our first research question on the 
impact of rating identifiers, tested using (i) pre-identifier and (ii) and post-identifier data 
samples. This robustness exercise allows us to observe the quality of ratings measured by their 
information content during the pre- and post-identifier periods (similar to Dimitrov et al., 
2015). A significant (insignificant) coefficient on ∆Rating implies high (poor) quality ratings 
in a given period because we are able to observe the extent to which bond yields respond to 
rating news (Becker and Milbourn, 2011). F-test results reveal statistical differences between 
the ∆Rating coefficients in the pre- and post-identifier sample periods for all estimations. The 
results of Tables 4-6 largely confirm the results from Eq. (1a). Specifically, there is a 
deterioration in rating quality associated with positive news from all CRAs after the disclosure 
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rule, while better quality ratings (more informative ratings) for Moody’s negative events. In 
addition, there is some evidence that Fitch (S&P) negative events are more (less) informative, 
i.e. better (lower) rating quality, in the post-identifier than in the pre-identifier period. 
 For S&P positive and negative events (Table 4), the coefficient on ∆Rating is significant, 
with the expected sign, in the pre-identifier period only and of much greater magnitude than in 
the post-identifier period (-3.408** vs. 0.253 for positive events; 4.174** vs.1.169 for negative 
events). The F-test confirms that the ∆Rating coefficient is statistically different across the two 
sub-periods (Prob>Chi-squared = 0.038 for positive events and 0.058 for negative events). 
These imply that S&P positive and negative events are less informative (lower quality) in the 
post-identifier versus pre-identifier period. 
 For Moody’s positive events (Table 5), similarly to those of S&P, the coefficient on ∆Rating 
is significant with the expected negative sign in the pre-identifier period only, and its 
coefficient’s magnitude is larger than in the post-identifier period (-3.474*** vs. -0.315). The 
F-test confirms that rating quality differs in the periods before and after the disclosure rule 
(Prob> Chi-squared = 0.052). This indicates that Moody’s positive events are less informative 
(lower quality) in the post-identifier than in the pre-identifier period, which is consistent with 
the relevant result in Table 3 (Eq. (1a)). For Moody’s negative events, ∆Rating is significant 
only in the post-identifier period, with the F-test confirming different rating quality between 
these periods. This implies that Moody’s negative events are more informative (of better 
quality) in the post-identifier than pre-identifier period, which is again consistent with the result 
of Table 3 (Eq. 1a). 
 For Fitch positive events, the coefficient on ∆Rating is significant in both time periods, with 
an unexpected positive sign in the post-identifier period, suggesting lower quality of Fitch 
positive events in the post-identifier period (in line with the relevant results in Table 3 (Eq. 
(1a)).  For Fitch negative events, the coefficient on ∆Rating is only significant in the post- 
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regulatory period with expected positive sign (i.e. wider spread). This indicates some evidence 
that Fitch negative events are more informative (better quality) in the post-identifier than in the 
pre-identifier period. The F-test results in Table 6 confirm that rating quality differs in the 
periods before and after the disclosure rule (Prob> Chi-squared = 0.002 for positive events and 
0.061 for negative events). 
 To further examine the second research question regarding the impact of rating analysts’ 
location on rating quality, we also estimate Eq. (2) using a sub-sample for the post-identifier 
period for the two groups of countries (EU-originated and EU-endorsed ratings) with the results 
presented in Tables 7-9. The results for news from S&P (Table 7) and Moody’s (Table 8) are 
inconsistent with those of Eq. (1b) in Table 3. The coefficient on ∆Rating is insignificant for 
S&P positive events, and with an insignificant F-test result, thereby suggesting that the location 
of S&P analysts (inside or outside the EU) has no significant impact on the information content 
of its positive events. A positive and significant (at the 10% level) coefficient on ∆Rating for 
S&P negative events is reported for the EE sub-sample, suggesting that this type of news is 
more informative when S&P analysts are located outside the EU. In Table 8, Moody’s positive 
events are more informative when their rating analysts are located in the EU (the coefficient 
on ∆Rating has the expected negative sign and is significant at the 10% level).17  
 On the other hand, the coefficient on ∆Rating is significant (with an unexpected positive 
sign) for Fitch positive events for ratings with EE identifiers (Table 9). This is consistent with 
the findings of Eq. (1b), indicating that these rating events are less informative, and is supported 
by a highly significant F-test result. The magnitude of the ∆Rating coefficient for Fitch negative 
events suggests that they have a stronger impact on widening bond spreads when Fitch’s rating 
analysts are located outside the EU (i.e. ratings with EE identifiers), and thus are of better 
                                                 
17 There are only 7 negative events by Moody’s in the EU sub-sample in the post-identifier period. The 
results in this case are not reliable and we have not reported the F-test. 
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quality than ratings issued by analysts located in the EU (6.092*** for EE versus 2.114* for 
EU). The F-test result confirms that rating quality differs between these EE- and EU- sub-
samples (Prob> Chi-squared = 0.096).    
    We further investigate our second research question, regarding the impact of the rating 
analysts’ location, by applying the difference-in-differences estimation of Eq. (3). The results, 
reported in Table 10, support the earlier findings based on Eq. (1b). Positive events by S&P 
and Moody’s are less informative (lower quality) in the post-identifier period when S&P rating 
analysts are located inside the EU and when Moody’s rating analysts are located outside the 
EU. This effect is captured by positive and significant coefficients (implying wider spreads) on 
∆Rating*EU and ∆Rating*EE variables respectively. However, for Fitch, the relevant results 
in Table 10 are insignificant and do not support those of Table 3 (Eq. (1b)) and Table 9 (Eq. 
(2)) which suggest that Fitch positive (negative) events are less (more) informative when Fitch 
rating analysts are located outside the EU.    
 
 
7. Conclusions     
 This paper presents a unique analysis of the impact of EU endorsement rules on the quality 
of credit ratings. Using a rich dataset of sovereign rating actions from Fitch, Moody’s and S&P 
for 70 countries during the period of 2006-2016, this paper presents the first evidence on the 
influence of ESMA identifiers. We investigate whether rating quality has changed as a 
consequence of the new disclosures, by utilizing the link between rating actions and bond 
yields. We also examine whether the location of rating analysts, inside versus outside the EU 
(i.e. ratings with EU versus EE identifiers), has a significant impact on rating informativeness. 
One key aspect in which this paper differs from studies based on US regulation is that it 
investigates the direct effect of the disclosure rules on rating quality, rather than measuring the 
effect of changing competition amongst CRAs.  
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 Our results suggest that the use of endorsement via identifiers does not achieve its objective 
of improved rating quality. In fact, there are cases of significant decreases in quality after the 
disclosure rules were introduced. Poorer (less informative) rating actions are reported for 
positive events by all CRAs after the introduction date. More detailed tests reveal some limited 
evidence that Moody’s and Fitch rating actions are less informative when the analysts are based 
outside the EU. Such inferior rating quality might be a consequence of third country CRA 
offices facing less scrutiny than those in the EU. In contrast, less informative positive events 
by S&P are those with EU identifiers. These findings are consistent with Dimitrov et al. (2015) 
who report that the US Dodd-Frank Act did not result in more accurate nor more informative 
ratings. To some extent, our results also resonate with Behr et al.’s (2018) findings that the US 
CRA regulation (SEC certification) had an adverse effect on quality as revealed via ratings 
inflation.  
 On the other hand, we find evidence of improvements in information content in the cases of 
Moody’s negative rating actions. Additionally, better quality rating downgrade actions are 
associated with Fitch when their rating analysts are located outside the EU (i.e. with ‘EE’ 
categories). Third country CRA offices seeking to establish a strong reputation for rating 
quality might explain this outcome. This is in line with the improved accuracy of downgrades 
reported by Bedendo et al. (2018) and de Haan (2017) for corporate ratings.  
 ESMA’s identifiers are intended to improve rating quality, yet not to be affected by the 
location of ratings analysts. Our mixed evidence on the impact of rating analysts’ location on 
rating informativeness clearly contributes towards an important stream of literature which 
assesses the effects of regulation on the quality of ratings. There has been no prior evidence on 
this aspect in the context of European CRA regulation. Yet, it deserves further attention from 
both regulators and academic researchers. Further, our findings of differing impact across 
different CRAs and rating events are consistent with the findings of prior literature with regard 
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to the varying impact of positive versus negative sovereign rating news on financial markets 
(e.g. Afonso et al., 2012; Baum et al., 2016; Bedendo et al., 2018). 
 Our findings are broadly in line with the theoretical predictions of Opp et al. (2013). These 
authors suggest that the quality of ratings as revealed by information content might improve or 
deteriorate depending on whether there are regulatory gains for the CRA from collecting 
additional information. If the costs of acquiring additional information outweigh its benefits, 
CRAs might decide to inflate ratings instead (e.g., our findings on all CRAs’ positive events). 
They also argue that when regulation promotes highly rated securities, the information content 
of rating actions (rating quality) may change depending on an endogenous threshold level of 
regulatory advantage. When the threshold has been crossed, the CRA no longer acquires 
information and enables regulatory arbitrage by inflating its ratings. Our results support the 
underlying premise of this theory. On the one hand, lower quality of upgrades by CRAs might 
suggest that the regulatory advantage of obtaining more information to issue such revisions is 
outweighed by the costs, and CRAs prefer to inflate the ratings instead. On the other hand, 
since some negative events signal new and unanticipated information to the market and result 
in stronger market reactions, CRAs may be encouraged by the regulation to invest time and 
resources in ensuring the quality of rating downgrades. 
 ESMA’s endorsement rules and the introduction of identifiers are very specific regulatory 
initiatives and cannot be directly compared to any regulations introduced in the US nor to any 
prior empirical studies. Investigating the influence of these endorsement rules on financial 
markets is of importance to policymakers, governments and market participants alike. 
Endorsement and identifiers could add credibility to CRAs’ decisions, thereby increasing the 
influence of rating actions. This paper’s findings thereby make a unique contribution to the 
policy debate.  
  
 
30 
References 
Abad, P., Ferreras, R., Robles, M-D., 2019. Informational role of rating revisions after 
reputational events and regulation reforms. International Review of Financial Analysis 62, 
91-103. 
Acharya, V., Almeida, H., Campello, M., 2013. Aggregate risk and the choice between cash 
and lines of credit. Journal of Finance 68, 2059-2116. 
Afonso, A., Furceri, D., Gomes, P., 2012. Sovereign credit ratings and financial markets 
linkages: Application to European data. Journal of International Money and Finance 31, 
606-638.  
Almeida, H., Ferreira, M.A., Restrepo, F., 2017. The real effects of credit ratings: the sovereign 
ceiling channel. Journal of Finance 72, 249-290. 
Amstad, M., Packer, F., 2015. Sovereign ratings of advanced and emerging economies after 
the crisis. BIS Quarterly Review, December 2015. 
Arezki, R., Candelon, B., Sy, A., 2011. Sovereign rating news and financial markets spillovers: 
Evidence from the European debt crisis. International Monetary Fund (IMF), Working 
Paper No. 11/68, pp. 1-27.  
Bae, K.H., Kang, J.K., Wang, J., 2015. Does increased competition affect credit ratings? A re-
examination of the effect of Fitch’s market share on credit ratings in the corporate bond 
market. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 50, 1011-1035. 
Baghai, R. P., Servaes, H., Tamayo, A., 2014. Have rating agencies become more 
conservative? Implications for capital structure and debt pricing. Journal of Finance 69, 
1961–2005. 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 2017. Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms. 
December 2017. 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 2014. Revisions to the Standardised Approach for 
credit risk. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) Consultative Document. 
December 2014. 
Bannier, C., Behr. P., Güttler, A., 2010. Rating opaque borrowers: Why are unsolicited ratings 
lower? Review of Finance 2, 263-294. 
Baum, C.F., Schafer, D., Stephan, A., 2016. Credit rating agency downgrades and the Eurozone 
sovereign debt crises. Journal of Financial Stability 24, 117-131. 
Becker, B., Milbourn, T., 2011. How did increased competition affect credit ratings? Journal 
of Financial Economics 101, 493–514. 
Bedendo, M., Cathcart, L., El-Jahel. L., 2018. Reputational shocks and the information content 
of credit ratings. Journal of Financial Stability 34, 44-60. 
 
31 
Behr, P., Kisgen, D., Taillard, J., 2018. Did government regulations lead to inflated credit 
ratings? Management Science 64, 1034-1054. 
Bolton, P., Freixas, X., Shapiro, J., 2012. The credit ratings game. Journal of Finance 67, 85–
112. 
Bongaerts, D., Cremers, M., Goetzmann, W., 2012. Tiebreaker: Certification and multiple 
credit ratings. Journal of Finance 67, 113-152. 
Borensztein, E., Cowan, K., Valenzuela, P., 2013. Sovereign ceiling lite? The impact of 
sovereign ratings on corporate ratings in emerging market economies. Journal of Banking 
and Finance 37, 4014-4024. 
Cai, P., Kim, S., Wu, E., 2019. Foreign direct investments from emerging markets: The push-
pull effects of sovereign credit ratings. International Review of Financial Analysis 61, 110-
125. 
Chen, S., Chen, H., Chang, C., Yang, S., 2016. The relation between sovereign credit rating 
revisions and economic growth. Journal of Banking and Finance 64, 90–100.  
Cheng, M., Neamtiu, M., 2009. An empirical analysis of changes in credit rating properties: 
Timeliness, accuracy and volatility. Journal of Accounting and Economics 47, 108–130. 
De Haan, E., 2017. The financial crisis and corporate credit ratings. The Accounting Review 
92, 161–189. 
Dimitrov, V., Palia, D., Tang, L., 2015. Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on credit ratings. Journal 
of Financial Economics 115, 505-520. 
Dodd-Frank Act 936, 2010. SEC. Qualification standards for credit rating analysts.  
Doherty, N., Kartasheva, A., Phillips, R., 2012. Information effect of entry into credit ratings 
market: The case of insurers’ ratings. Journal of Financial Economics 106, 308-330. 
European Central Bank (ECB) 2012. Opinion of the European Central Bank of 2 April 2012. 
Official Journal of the European Union 167C, 2-14. 
European Commission (EC) 2011. Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies. 
November 2011. 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 2017a. ESMA clarifies endorsement 
regime for third-country credit ratings. Press Release. November 17 2017. ESMA71/99/642. 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 2017b. Update of the guidelines on the 
application of the endorsement regime under Article 4(3) of the Credit Rating Agencies 
Regulation. Final Report. November 17 2017. ESMA33/9/205. 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 2017c. Final Report Technical advice on 
CRA regulatory equivalence – CRA 3 update. November 17 2017. ESMA33/9/207. 
 
32 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 2016. Competition and choice in the 
credit rating industry. Market share calculation required by Article 8d of Regulation 
1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies as amended. December 16 2016. ESMA/2016/1662. 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 2012. ESMA approves credit ratings from 
Brazil for use in the EU. Press Release. April 27 2012. ESMA/2012/274. 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 2011a. Guidelines on the application of 
the endorsement regime under Article 4(3) of the Credit Rating Regulation 1060/2009. 
ESMA/2011/139. 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 2011b. ESMA allows EU-registered 
CRAs to endorse credit ratings issued in the US, Canada, Hong Kong and Singapore. Press 
Release. ESMA/2012/158. 
Flynn, S., Ghent, A., 2018. Competition and credit ratings after the fall. Management Science 
64, 1672-1692. 
Gande, A., Parsley, D.C., 2005. News spillovers in the sovereign debt market. Journal of 
Financial Economics 73, 691–734. 
Goel, A., Thakor, A., 2011. Credit ratings and litigation risk. Working paper. Navigant 
Economics and Washington University, Saint Louis. 
Hill, P., Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, E., Faff, R., 2018. New evidence on sovereign to corporate 
credit rating spill-overs. International Review of Financial Analysis 55, 209-225. 
Kahl, M., Shivdasani, A., Yihui, W., 2015. Short-term debt as bridge financing: Evidence from 
the commercial paper market. Journal of Finance 70, 211-255. 
Kiff, J., Nowak, S., Schumacher, L., 2012. Are rating agencies powerful? An investigation into 
the impact and accuracy of sovereign ratings. International Monetary Fund working paper, 
WP/12/23. 
Kisgen, D.J., Strahan, P.E., 2010. Do regulations based on credit ratings affect a firm's cost of 
capital? Review of Financial Studies 23, 4324-4347. 
Livingston, M., Wei, D., Zhou, L., 2010. Moody’s and S&P ratings: Are they equivalent? 
Conservative ratings and split rated bond yields. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 42, 
1267-1293. 
Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 2013. Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 
1060/2009 on credit rating agencies. Regulation Legislative Acts 146/1, 31 May 2013. 
Opp, C.C., Opp, M.M., Harris, M., 2013. Rating agencies in the face of regulation. Journal of 
Financial Economics 108, 46-61. 
 
 
 
33 
Table 1. Sovereign credit rating actions by CRAs  
Entire sample S&P Moody's Fitch 
Observations 346  245  232  
Average numerical rating  27.41  28.13  29.07  
Positive events 152 43.93% 141 57.55% 116 50.00% 
Upgrade by 1 CCR point 77 22.25%   74 30.20% 52 22.42% 
Upgrade by 2 CCR point 36 10.41% 41 16.73% 35 15.08% 
Upgrade by > 2 CCR point 39 11.27% 26 10.61% 29 12.50% 
Negative events 194 56.07% 104 42.45% 116 50.00% 
Downgrade by 1 CCR point 94 27.17% 47 19.18% 57 24.57% 
Downgrade by 2 CCR point 43 12.43% 35 14.29% 22 9.48% 
Downgrade by > 2 CCR point 57 16.47% 22 8.98% 37 15.95% 
Total no of events 346 100.00% 245 100.00% 232 100.00% 
Pre-identifier  
     
Observations 181  121  124  
Average numerical rating  28.27  29.92  30.37  
Positive events 83 45.86% 81 66.94% 64 51.61% 
Upgrade by 1 CCR point 40 22.10% 47 38.84% 29 23.39% 
Upgrade by 2 CCR point 18 9.95% 24 19.84% 21 16.93% 
Upgrade by > 2 CCR point 25 13.81% 10 8.26% 14 11.29% 
Negative events 98 54.14% 40 33.06% 60 48.39% 
Downgrade by 1 CCR point 45 24.86% 22 18.18% 31 25.00% 
Downgrade by 2 CCR point 22 12.15% 18 14.88% 10 8.06% 
Downgrade by > 2 CCR point 31 17.13% 0 0.00% 19 15.32% 
Total no of events 181 100.00% 121 100.00% 124 100.00% 
Post-identifier  
     
Observations 165  124  108  
Average numerical rating  26.46  26.38  27.58  
Positive events 69 41.82% 60 48.39% 52 48.15% 
Upgrade by 1 CCR point 37 22.42% 27 21.77% 23 21.30% 
Upgrade by 2 CCR point 18 10.91% 17 13.71% 14 12.96% 
Upgrade by > 2 CCR point 14 8.48% 16 12.90% 15 13.89% 
Negative events 96 58.18% 64 51.61% 56 51.85% 
Downgrade by 1 CCR point 49 29.70% 25 20.16% 26 24.07% 
Downgrade by 2 CCR point 21 12.72% 17 13.71% 12 11.11% 
Downgrade by > 2 CCR point 26 15.76% 22 17.74% 18 16.67% 
Total no of events 165 100.00% 124 100.00% 108 100.00% 
 
Note: This table presents summary statistics for the credit rating dataset, which includes daily sovereign 
rating observations including outlook and watch by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch for 70 countries for pre-
identifier (Jan 2006-April 2012) and post-identifier (May 2012-June 2016) periods. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics of credit events by CRAs  
Sample S&P Moody's Fitch 
No of countries 66 54 51 
No of sovereign bonds 130 96 92 
No of benchmark bonds 65 56 52 
Mean ∆Yield 0.47 1.68 2.22 
S.D. ∆Yield 23.14 23.36 16.70 
Mean Rating58 (1-58) 27.41 28.13 29.07 
S.D. Rating58 (1-58) 12.06 12.47 11.58 
Mean term to maturity (years) 7.39 6.79 6.98 
S.D. term to maturity (years) 6.49 6.20 5.99 
Mean coupon rate (%) 6.82 6.98 6.78 
S.D. coupon rate (%) 2.30 2.33 2.25 
Mean amount issued (billion USD) 1.19 1.13 1.23 
S.D. amount issued (billion USD) 1.07 1.04 1.05 
Notes. This table presents summary statistics of credit events for each CRA for 70 sovereigns from Jan 
2006 to June 2016. ∆Yield is the change in yield spread to the closest maturity Treasury Bond in the 
time window [0, +1]. Rating58 represents sovereign’s CCR taking values 1-58. Maturity is bond’s time 
to maturity.  
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Table 3. Impact of identifiers on the quality of ratings as measured by bond yields 
Panel I: Positive events 
 
  S&P Moody's Fitch 
VARIABLES Eq.(1a) Eq.(1b) Eq.(1a) Eq.(1b) Eq.(1a) Eq.(1b) 
∆Rating -3.420*** -3.476*** -3.226** -3.232** -1.399 -1.401 
 (-2.86) (-2.87) (-2.20) (-2.20) (-1.55) (-1.55) 
Identifier -1.674  -1.894  -4.636  
 (-0.54)  (-0.54)  (-0.92)  
∆Rating* Identifier 3.644**  3.395*  2.214*  
 (1.99)  (1.65)  (1.67)  
Rating58 0.214 0.250 -0.316 -0.317 -0.446** -0.420* 
 (0.57) (0.64) (-1.02) (-1.02) (-2.06) (-1.91) 
Maturity -1.501 -1.528 -4.280*** -4.297*** -2.771*** -2.790*** 
 (-0.90) (-0.91) (-2.79) (-2.78) (-2.76) (-2.77) 
EE  -2.197  -2.673  -5.606 
  (-0.53)  (-0.72)  (-0.98) 
EU  -0.855  1.862  -3.664 
  (-0.19)  (0.25)  (-0.68) 
∆Rating *EE 3.358  3.995*  3.435** 
  (1.42)  (1.82)  (2.04) 
∆Rating *EU  3.993*  1.415  1.171 
   (1.75)  (0.41)  (0.74) 
Observations 304 304 282 282 232 232 
R-squared 0.1047 0.1053 0.1726 0.1750 0.2700 0.2381 
country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3. Continued.  
Panel II: CRAs negative events 
  S&P Moody's Fitch 
VARIABLES Eq.(1a) Eq.(1b) Eq.(1a) Eq.(1b) Eq.(1a) Eq.(1b) 
∆Rating 3.926*** 3.860*** -2.039 -1.907 2.770** 2.725** 
 (2.81) (2.76) (-0.57) (-0.53) (2.30) (2.29) 
Identifier 3.903  -2.997  -3.882  
 (1.01)  (-0.41)  (-1.09)  
∆Rating* Identifier -0.943  6.964*  1.816  
 (-0.48)  (1.69)  (1.08)  
Rating58 0.684** 0.670** 0.290 0.518 0.023 0.005 
 (2.09) (2.05) (0.60) (0.97) (0.09) (0.02) 
Maturity -2.361 -2.396 -0.689 -1.051 -3.247* -2.538 
 (-1.32) (-1.33) (-0.22) (-0.30) (-1.84) (-1.43) 
EE  3.235  -2.399  -2.527 
  (0.59)  (-0.32)  (-0.47) 
EU  3.765  9.669  -2.930 
  (0.86)  (0.49)  (-0.74) 
∆Rating *EE -0.528  6.639  4.091** 
  (-0.21)  (1.58)  (1.99) 
∆Rating *EU  -1.137  8.301  -0.857 
   (-0.48)  (1.02)  (-0.41) 
Observations 388 388 208 208 232 232 
R-squared 0.1326 0.1323 0.2554 0.2604 0.2975 0.3170 
country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specifications of Eq. (1a) and Eq. (1b). The dataset consists of daily positive and 
negative sovereign events by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch based in 58-CCR rating scale for 70 countries during Jan 2006-June 2016. For every event observation there is a randomly 
selected non-event observation. The dependent variable is ∆Yield which measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the 
benchmark US bonds on a particular sovereign bond i on the event day t. ∆Rating is the change in sovereign issuer CCR by one of the three CRAs coded as absolute ordinal 
values 1 (1-CCR), 2 (2-CCR) and 3 (>2-CCR), and 0 (no change). Identifier dummy equals 1 after the endorsement rules introduced by ESMA took effect on April 30 2012, 
and 0 otherwise. Rating58 represents sovereign’s CCR taking values 1-58. Maturity is bond’s time to maturity. EE (EU) takes the value of 1 if the rating of sovereign i is EU 
endorsed (EU originated) in the post-identifier period (30 April 2012), 0 otherwise. Year (country) fixed effects are included (“yes”). We estimate Eq. (1a) and (1b) separately 
for positive and negative events with absolute values (Panel I and II) for interpretation reasons. ***, **, * are significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
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Table 4. Statistical differences between rating change coefficients in the pre and post-identifier periods: S&P  
                                              S&P positive events S&P negative events 
VARIABLES 
F-tests using Eq. (2) F-tests using Eq. (2) 
 pre-identifier post-identifier pre-identifier post-identifier 
∆Rating -3.408** 0.253 4.174*** 1.169 
 (-2.05) (0.38) (3.31) (1.57) 
Rating58 0.511 0.663* 1.3734*** -0.022 
 (0.64) (1.72) (3.28) (-0.22) 
Maturity 0.701 -1.729 -1.615 -2.015* 
 (0.20) (-0.77) (-0.77) (-1.84) 
     
Observations 166 138 196 192 
R-squared 0.109 0.338 0.169 0.100 
country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 [pre_mean]∆Rating- [post_mean]∆Rating = 0 [pre_mean]∆Rating - [post_mean]∆Rating = 0 
 Test:  chi2 ( 1) Test:  Prob > chi2 Test:  chi2 ( 1) Test:  Prob > chi2 
 4.27 0.038 3.59 0.058 
 
Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specification of Eq. (2) using Ordinary Least Squares followed 
by the F-test which compares the statistical difference between ∆Rating coefficients in two sample periods. The credit rating dataset consists of daily positive 
and negative sovereign events by S&P based on 58-CCR rating scale for 66 countries during pre-identifier (Jan 2006-April 2012) and post-identifier (May 
2012-June 2016) periods. For every event observation there is a randomly selected non-event observation. The dependent variable is ∆Yield which measures, 
in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the benchmark US bonds on a particular sovereign bond i on the event day 
t. The independent variables are defined in Table 3. F-test conducted using ‘suest’ command in STATA. Country fixed effects are included (“yes”). We estimate 
Eq. (2) separately for positive and negative events with absolute values for interpretation reasons. ***, **, * are significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
 
 
 
38 
Table 5. Statistical differences between rating change coefficients in the pre and post-identifier periods: Moody’s  
                                                   Moody’s positive events Moody’s negative events 
VARIABLES 
F-tests using Eq. (2) F-tests using Eq. (2) 
 pre-identifier post-identifier pre-identifier post-identifier 
∆Rating -3.474** -0.315 -3.740 5.553*** 
 (-2.05) (-0.22) (-0.83) (2.72) 
Rating58 -0.234 0.421 -0.064 1.575** 
 (-0.37) (0.55) (-0.22) (2.13) 
Maturity -3.947 -1.145 0.538 -5.376 
 (-1.37) (-0.29) (0.11) (-1.20) 
     
Observations 162 120 80 128 
R-squared 0.196 0.238 0.100 0.225 
country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 [pre_mean]∆Rating- [post_mean]∆Rating = 0 [pre_mean]∆Rating - [post_mean]∆Rating = 0 
 Test:  chi2 ( 1) Test:  Prob > chi2 Test:  chi2 ( 1) Test:  Prob > chi2 
 3.78 0.052 3.42 0.064 
 
Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specification of Eq. (2) using Ordinary Least Squares followed 
by the F-test which compares the statistical difference between ∆Rating coefficients in two sample periods. The credit rating dataset consists of daily positive 
and negative sovereign events by Moody’s based on 58-CCR rating scale for 54 countries during pre-identifier (Jan 2006-April 2012) and post-identifier (May 
2012-June 2016) periods. For every event observation there is a randomly selected non-event observation. The dependent variable is ∆Yield which measures, 
in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the benchmark US bonds on a particular sovereign bond i on the event day 
t. The independent variables are defined in Table 3. F-test conducted using ‘suest’ command in STATA. Country fixed effects are included (“yes”). We estimate 
Eq. (2) separately for positive and negative events with absolute values for interpretation reasons. ***, **, * are significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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Table 6. Statistical differences between rating change coefficients in the pre and post-identifier periods: Fitch  
                                            Fitch positive events Fitch negative events 
VARIABLES 
F-tests using Eq. (2) F-tests using Eq. (2) 
 pre-identifier post-identifier pre-identifier post-identifier 
∆Rating -1.330*** 0.934** 0.525 3.041*** 
 (-2.63) (2.06) (0.68) (3.60) 
Rating58 0.148 -1.095*** -0.396** 1.623* 
 1.11 (-4.34) (-2.43) (1.89) 
Maturity -0.463 -1.328 1.345 -11.264*** 
 (-0.36) (-0.79) (0.58) (-3.35) 
     
Observations 128 104 120 112 
R-squared 0.135 0.399 0.168 0.459 
country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 [pre_mean]∆Rating- [post_mean]∆Rating = 0 [pre_mean]∆Rating - [post_mean]∆Rating = 0 
 Test:  chi2 ( 1) Test:  Prob > chi2 Test:  chi2 ( 1) Test:  Prob > chi2 
 9.40 0.002 3.51 0.061 
 
Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specification of Eq. (2) using Ordinary Least Squares followed 
by the F-test which compares the statistical difference between ∆Rating coefficients in two sample periods. The credit rating dataset consists of daily positive 
and negative sovereign events by Fitch based on 58-CCR rating scale for 51 countries during pre-identifier (Jan 2006-April 2012) and post-identifier (May 
2012-June 2016) periods. For every event observation there is a randomly selected non-event observation. The dependent variable is ∆Yield which measures, 
in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the benchmark US bonds on a particular sovereign bond i on the event day 
t. The independent variables are defined in Table 3. F-test conducted using ‘suest’ command in STATA. Country fixed effects are included (“yes). We estimate 
Eq. (2) separately for positive and negative events with absolute values for interpretation reasons. ***, **, * are significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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Table 7. Statistical differences between rating change coefficients by analyst location, May 2012-June 2016: S&P  
                                                S&P positive events S&P negative events 
VARIABLES 
F-tests using Eq. (2) F-tests using Eq. (2) 
 EE sub-sample EU sub-sample EE sub-sample EU sub-sample 
∆Rating 0.503 -0.101 5.295* 0.351 
 (1.34) (-0.19) (1.87) (0.40) 
Rating58 0.251** 1.104* 1.342* -2.382* 
 (1.96) (1.76) (1.75) (-1.72) 
Maturity -1.933* -0.237 -8.385*** -2.773 
 (-1.82) (-0.10) (-2.81) (-0.89) 
     
Observations 56 82 84 116 
R-squared 0.331 0.301 0.128 0.378 
country fe Yes yes Yes Yes 
 [EEsample_mean]∆Rating- [EUsample_mean]∆Rating = 0 [EEsample_mean]∆Rating - [EUsample_mean]∆Rating = 0 
 Test:  chi2 ( 1) Test:  Prob > chi2 Test:  chi2 ( 1) Test:  Prob > chi2 
   0.83 0.360 2.77 0.095 
 
Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specification of Eq. (2) using Ordinary Least Squares followed 
by the F-test which compares the statistical difference between ∆Rating coefficients for the two groups of countries (EU vs EU identifier) in the post-identifier 
sample period (May 2012-June 2016). The credit rating dataset consists of daily positive and negative sovereign events by S&P based on 58-CCR rating scale. 
EU (EE) sub-sample consists of sovereign rating events with EU (EE) identifiers. For every event observation there is a randomly selected non-event 
observation. The dependent variable is ∆Yield which measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the benchmark 
US bonds on a particular sovereign bond i on the event day t. The independent variables are defined in Table 3. F-test conducted using ‘suest’ command in 
STATA. Country fixed effects are included (“yes”). We estimate Eq. (2) separately for positive and negative events with absolute values for interpretation 
reasons. ***, **, * are significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
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Table 8. Statistical differences between rating change coefficients by analyst location, May 2012-June 2016: Moody’s  
                                            Moody’s positive events Moody’s negative events 
VARIABLES 
F-tests using Eq. (2) F-tests using Eq. (2) 
 EE sub-sample EU sub-sample EE sub-sample EU sub-sample (a) 
∆Rating 0.606 -1.630* 5.607***  
 (0.57) (-1.92) (2.59)  
Rating58 .620 -0.242 1.982*  
 (1.07) (-0.65) (1.65)  
Maturity -5.380 -1.168 -5.818  
 (-0.82) (-1.03) (-1.24)  
     
Observations 90 40 118  
R-squared 0.305 0.417 0.195  
country fe Yes Yes Yes  
 [EEsample_mean]∆Rating- [EUsample_mean]∆Rating = 0  
 Test:  chi2 ( 1) Test:  Prob > chi2   
 2.79 0.094   
 
Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specification of Eq. (2) using Ordinary Least Squares followed 
by the F-test which compares the statistical difference between ∆Rating coefficients for the two groups of countries (EU vs EU identifier) in the post-identifier 
sample period (May 2012-June 2016). The credit rating dataset consists of daily positive and negative sovereign events by Moody’s based on 58-CCR rating 
scale. EU (EE) sub-sample consists of sovereign rating events with EU (EE) identifiers. For every event observation there is a randomly selected non-event 
observation. The dependent variable is ∆Yield which measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the benchmark 
US bonds on a particular sovereign bond i on the event day t. The independent variables are defined in Table 3. F-test conducted using ‘suest’ command in 
STATA. Country fixed effects are included (“yes”). We estimate Eq. (2) separately for positive and negative events with absolute values for interpretation 
reasons. ***, **, * are significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
(a)There are only 7 negative events by Moody’s in the EU post-identifier sub-sample. The results in this case are not reliable and we have not reported the F-
test. 
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Table 9. Statistical differences between rating change coefficients by analyst location, May 2012-June 2016: Fitch  
                                                   Fitch positive events Fitch negative events 
VARIABLES 
F-tests using Eq. (2) F-tests using Eq. (2) 
 EE sub-sample EU sub-sample EE sub-sample EU sub-sample 
∆Rating 4.002*** -1.075* 6.092*** 2.114* 
 (3.12) (-1.83) (2.70) (1.72) 
Rating58 -2.099*** 0.271* -0.853 -0.077 
 (-3.41) (1.71) (-0.96) (-0.76) 
Maturity -0.615 -5.948*** -3.919 -0.569 
 (-0.24) (-4.07) (-0.58) (-0.39) 
     
Observations 42 62 52 74 
R-squared 0.555 0.589 0.349 0.128 
country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 [EEsample_mean]∆Rating- [EUsample_mean]∆Rating = 0 [EEsample_mean]∆Rating - [EUsample_mean]∆Rating = 0 
 Test:  chi2 ( 1) Test:  Prob > chi2 Test:  chi2 ( 1) Test:  Prob > chi2 
 12.92 0.000 2.76 0.096 
 
Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specification of Eq. (2) using Ordinary Least Squares followed 
by the F-test which compares the statistical difference between ∆Rating coefficients for the two groups of countries (EU vs EU identifier) in the post-identifier 
sample period (May 2012-June 2016). The credit rating dataset consists of daily positive and negative sovereign events by Fitch based on 58-CCR rating. EU 
(EE) sub-sample consists of sovereign rating events with EU (EE) identifiers. For every event observation there is a randomly selected non-event observation. 
The dependent variable is ∆Yield which measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the benchmark US bonds 
on a particular sovereign bond i on the event day t. The independent variables are defined in Table 3. F-test conducted using ‘suest’ command in STATA. 
Country fixed effects are included (“yes”). We estimate Eq. (2) separately for positive and negative events with absolute values for interpretation reasons. ***, 
**, * are significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specifications of Eq. (3) using Ordinary Least Squares. The credit 
rating dataset consists of daily positive and negative sovereign events by: S&P, Moody’s and Fitch based on 58-CCR rating scale for 70 countries during Jan 
2006-June 2016. For every event observation there is a randomly selected non-event observation. The dependent variable is ∆Yield which measures, in basis 
points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the benchmark US bonds on a particular sovereign bond i on the event day t. EEB 
(‘EE’ Before) equals to 1 during the pre-identifier period for those countries which have the ‘EE’ identifier in the post-identifier period, and 0 otherwise. EUB 
(‘EU’ Before) equals to 1 during the pre-identifier period for those countries which have the ‘EU’ identifier in the post-identifier period, and 0 otherwise. EE 
(EU) takes the value of 1 if the rating of sovereign i is EU endorsed (EU originated) in the post-identifier period (30 April 2012), 0 otherwise. Rating58 
represents sovereign’s CCR taking values 1-58. Maturity is bond’s time to maturity. Country fixed effects are included (“yes”). We estimate Eq. (3) separately 
for positive and negative events with absolute values for interpretation reasons. ***, **, * are significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
 
 
Table 10. Difference-in-Differences estimation: Treatment versus control countries 
VARIABLES S&P + S&P - Moody's + Moody's - Fitch + Fitch - 
       
∆Rating*EUB -9.026*** 1.214 0.528 -3.210 -2.128 2.167* 
 (-2.95) (0.77) (0.12) (-0.43) (-1.09) (1.67) 
∆Rating*EEB -3.297** 0.660 -4.702** -1.182 0.785 7.582*** 
 (-2.14) (0.27) (-2.20) (-0.31) (0.61) (3.16) 
∆Rating*EE 2.722 2.288 5.005** 5.569 0.391 -0.601 
 (1.27) (0.81) (1.98) (1.38) (0.25) (-0.23) 
∆Rating*EU 8.946*** 1.413 -1.058 12.646 1.237 -1.330 
 (2.70) (0.66) (-0.22) (1.49) (0.59) (-0.71) 
Rating58 0.184 0.468 -0.297 0.490 -0.371* 0.060 
 (0.50) (1.63) (-0.91) (1.22) (-1.77) (0.27) 
Maturity -2.131 -2.515 -3.893** -0.250 -2.558** -2.239 
 (-1.27) (-1.39) (-2.50) (-0.08) (-2.55) (-1.30) 
       
Observations 304 388 282 208 232 232 
R-squared 0.1221 0.1134 0.1953 0.2585 0.2353 0.3368 
country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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    Appendix A: Credit rating scale 
Rating symbols Outlook/Watch  58-point  Adjustments 
58-point CCR 
scale 
AAA/Aaa stable watch/outlook   0 58 
AAA/Aaa negative outlook  58 -1 57 
AAA/Aaa negative watch   -2 56 
AA+/Aa1 positive watch   2 57 
AA+/Aa1 positive outlook   1 56 
AA+/Aa1 stable watch/outlook  55 0 55 
AA+/Aa1 negative outlook   -1 54 
AA+/Aa1 negative watch   -2 53 
AA/Aa2 positive watch   2 54 
AA/Aa2 positive outlook   1 53 
AA/Aa2 stable watch/outlook  52 0 52 
AA/Aa2 negative outlook   -1 51 
AA/Aa2 negative watch   -2 50 
AA-/Aa3 positive watch   2 51 
AA-/Aa3 positive outlook   1 50 
AA-/Aa3 stable watch/outlook  49 0 49 
AA-/Aa3 negative outlook   -1 48 
AA-/Aa3 negative watch   -2 47 
[……] [……]  [……] [……] [……] 
B-/B3 positive watch   2 15 
B-/B3 positive outlook   1 14 
B-/B3 stable watch/outlook  13 0 13 
B-/B3 negative outlook   -1 12 
B-/B3 negative watch   -2 11 
CCC+/Caa1 positive watch   2 12 
CCC+/Caa1 positive outlook   1 11 
CCC+/Caa1 stable watch/outlook  10 0 10 
CCC+/Caa1 negative outlook   -1 9 
CCC+/Caa1 negative watch   -2 8 
CCC/Caa2 positive watch   2 9 
CCC/Caa2 positive outlook   1 8 
CCC/Caa2 stable watch/outlook  7 0 7 
CCC/Caa2 negative outlook   -1 6 
CCC/Caa2 negative watch   -2 5 
CCC-/Caa3 positive watch   2 6 
CCC-/Caa3 positive outlook   1 5 
CCC-/Caa3 stable watch/outlook  4 0 4 
CCC-/Caa3 negative outlook   -1 3 
CCC-/Caa3 negative watch   -2 2 
CC, SD, D/ 
Ca, C/ RD, D   1 
 1 
 This Table presents the transformation of the alphabetical rating scale to the 58-point CCR numerical rating scale. 
